Posted by John Keller
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 26 Nov. 2013. Engineering services and support. That's what I'm seeing for the vast majority of today's Pentagon contract announcements. Not new procurement or research programs, but engineering services and support.
Not that there's anything wrong with this, but it's a big indication that the technology base of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is at best standing still, and more likely is slowly slipping backwards.
When the DOD is operating in a healthy way it's common to see new programs in the contract announcements, or additions to existing programs such as systems upgrades and technology insertion. But engineering services and support? This is basically just keeping the lights on.
What I see at work for the U.S. military is what I call the Mothball Strategy. We've seen it before, back in the late '70s during the Carter Administration, and in the mid-'90s under the Clinton Administration.
The Mothball Strategy means the DOD simply is hunkering down, and trying to keep its existing weapons and systems functioning adequately, and its manufacturing base from disappearing. Real capability and real technology development is put away in the closet because for now the DOD can't afford it. All efforts go into maintaining what the military forces have today, not in moving forward.
The Mothball Strategy for the Pentagon is like a drowning man who's just been thrown a life preserver. He's just gasping for air and grateful still to be alive; for the moment, he's not concerned with getting anywhere, just with keeping his head above water.
The Mothball Strategy for the Pentagon means nothing much happens, except keeping the military forces alive as best that leaders can. In the long term it means a stationary military force that decays into obsolescence more each day.
... and it means more engineering services and support contracts to plug the inevitable leaks.
Welcome to The Mil & Aero Blog. This is where our staff recount tales of the strange, the weird, and the otherwise offbeat. We could put news here, but we have the rest of our Website for that. Enjoy our scribblings, and feel free to add your own opinions. You might also get to know us in the process. Proceed at your own risk.
Tuesday, November 26, 2013
Tuesday, November 19, 2013
The revenge of COTS: an ageing commercial technology base complicates military supply chain
Posted by John Keller
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 19 Nov. 2013. The U.S. military's move to replace custom-designed mil-spec electronic subsystems and components with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic was supposed to reduce costs and give the military access to the latest technology.
That was the intent, but the stark realities of sequestration, program reductions, and other downward pressures on military spending may be creating conditions that not only are far worse than what was expected, but also perhaps even worse than the problems that COTS was supposed to alleviate.
What military program managers and the defense industry face today is a broadly installed base of COTS electronics with capabilities and supportability that is going obsolete rapidly, and with diminishing prospects for being brought back up to date because of crushing military budget cuts.
The year was 1994 when then-Defense Secretary William Perry ushered in the COTS era when he declared that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) should stop inventing its own unique electronics and instead take advantage of advanced developments in a booming commercial electronics sector.
Custom-designed mil-spec electronic components were expensive to build, and often were less capable than their commercial counterparts. The 1990s saw the end of the Cold War, and there was immense pressure at the time to enhance military capability and reduce costs. We had to do more with less ... sound familiar? With various fits and starts, Perry's COTS philosophy took hold, and today is woven tightly into the fabric of the military procurement culture. In many ways, COTS have lived up to its promise of improving access to technology at affordable cost.
In the rapid move to COTS, custom-designed mil-spec components became the pariahs of the military procurement world. Once systems designers got used to the capabilities and low costs that COTS provided, they vowed never again to go back to the buggy-whip mil-spec days.
Still, in the rapid move to COTS, which pervades nearly all kinds of military electronics design today, systems designers and program managers have lost sight of some of the benefits of custom-designed mil-spec components.
Tops among these benefits is the longevity of mil-spec electronics. This technology was reliable, maintainable, and lasted a long time. These attributes were perfect for a U.S. military that expected to keep military platforms in service for many decades.
Even when mil-spec components became obsolete, they still were rugged and reliable, and their manufacturers were committed to supporting them for as long as the military needed them. Manufacturers of COTS components, however, rarely made commitments for long-term support.
Before the embrace of COTS technology by the Pentagon and the defense industry, COTS was criticized for its short shelf life. Rapid obsolescence was one of the chief complaints, and was one of the most convincing reasons that systems designers gave who were seeking waivers from COTS requirements. Today many of these critics are being vindicated.
The long-term success of COTS-based military design is based on the fundamental assumption that COTS-based systems must be upgraded far more rapidly than they were in the mil-spec era of the early 1990s and before.
The military program managers of the 1990s and early 2000s bought into this approach. The potential benefits of COTS were clear, yet they knew that without frequent technology refresh, COTS technology would become obsolete quickly, which would compromise capability and complicate maintenance and logistics.
Today many of those program managers who understood the price of COTS are gone, having been promoted out of the procurement chain, or retired from the service. Many program managers today simply expect the benefits of COTS, but do not appreciate the fundamental assumptions on which COTS is based -- the need for frequent technology refresh.
Military budget cuts are delaying or eliminating scheduled rounds of component upgrades for military systems. Those COTS components that were supposed to be switched out ever five years or so are staying in the field longer than ever. Sometimes only portions of fleets are being upgraded, leaving others to make-do with what they have for indefinite periods.
The results are predictable -- obsolete parts and a complicated logistics chain are exactly what we're seeing today as the military adjusts to a rapid downturn in spending. We have electronic components that are going obsolete quickly, with only spotty long-term support. Obsolete COTS technology can be far more problematic than obsolete mil-spec technology.
To compensate, component suppliers must resort to drastic measures with increasing frequency. Sometimes, for example, they must install data bridges in their systems designed to fool new COTS technology into functioning like old COTS technology.
Yes, it is absurd, but the military/industrial complex is beginning to reap what it has sown. As defense budgets are cut back even more, the problem only threatens to get worse. The COTS approach works only as long as it gets the support it needs. Without proper technology refresh, COTS is taking its revenge.
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 19 Nov. 2013. The U.S. military's move to replace custom-designed mil-spec electronic subsystems and components with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic was supposed to reduce costs and give the military access to the latest technology.
That was the intent, but the stark realities of sequestration, program reductions, and other downward pressures on military spending may be creating conditions that not only are far worse than what was expected, but also perhaps even worse than the problems that COTS was supposed to alleviate.
What military program managers and the defense industry face today is a broadly installed base of COTS electronics with capabilities and supportability that is going obsolete rapidly, and with diminishing prospects for being brought back up to date because of crushing military budget cuts.
The year was 1994 when then-Defense Secretary William Perry ushered in the COTS era when he declared that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) should stop inventing its own unique electronics and instead take advantage of advanced developments in a booming commercial electronics sector.
Custom-designed mil-spec electronic components were expensive to build, and often were less capable than their commercial counterparts. The 1990s saw the end of the Cold War, and there was immense pressure at the time to enhance military capability and reduce costs. We had to do more with less ... sound familiar? With various fits and starts, Perry's COTS philosophy took hold, and today is woven tightly into the fabric of the military procurement culture. In many ways, COTS have lived up to its promise of improving access to technology at affordable cost.
Still, in the rapid move to COTS, which pervades nearly all kinds of military electronics design today, systems designers and program managers have lost sight of some of the benefits of custom-designed mil-spec components.
Tops among these benefits is the longevity of mil-spec electronics. This technology was reliable, maintainable, and lasted a long time. These attributes were perfect for a U.S. military that expected to keep military platforms in service for many decades.
Even when mil-spec components became obsolete, they still were rugged and reliable, and their manufacturers were committed to supporting them for as long as the military needed them. Manufacturers of COTS components, however, rarely made commitments for long-term support.
Before the embrace of COTS technology by the Pentagon and the defense industry, COTS was criticized for its short shelf life. Rapid obsolescence was one of the chief complaints, and was one of the most convincing reasons that systems designers gave who were seeking waivers from COTS requirements. Today many of these critics are being vindicated.
The long-term success of COTS-based military design is based on the fundamental assumption that COTS-based systems must be upgraded far more rapidly than they were in the mil-spec era of the early 1990s and before.
The military program managers of the 1990s and early 2000s bought into this approach. The potential benefits of COTS were clear, yet they knew that without frequent technology refresh, COTS technology would become obsolete quickly, which would compromise capability and complicate maintenance and logistics.
Today many of those program managers who understood the price of COTS are gone, having been promoted out of the procurement chain, or retired from the service. Many program managers today simply expect the benefits of COTS, but do not appreciate the fundamental assumptions on which COTS is based -- the need for frequent technology refresh.
Military budget cuts are delaying or eliminating scheduled rounds of component upgrades for military systems. Those COTS components that were supposed to be switched out ever five years or so are staying in the field longer than ever. Sometimes only portions of fleets are being upgraded, leaving others to make-do with what they have for indefinite periods.
The results are predictable -- obsolete parts and a complicated logistics chain are exactly what we're seeing today as the military adjusts to a rapid downturn in spending. We have electronic components that are going obsolete quickly, with only spotty long-term support. Obsolete COTS technology can be far more problematic than obsolete mil-spec technology.
To compensate, component suppliers must resort to drastic measures with increasing frequency. Sometimes, for example, they must install data bridges in their systems designed to fool new COTS technology into functioning like old COTS technology.
Yes, it is absurd, but the military/industrial complex is beginning to reap what it has sown. As defense budgets are cut back even more, the problem only threatens to get worse. The COTS approach works only as long as it gets the support it needs. Without proper technology refresh, COTS is taking its revenge.
Tuesday, November 12, 2013
Navy's newest destroyers evolve to fill traditional battleship roles
Posted by John Keller
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 12 Nov. 2013. U.S. Navy leaders have launched the first in a new class of surface warships designed for shore bombardment -- a job that traditionally belongs to battleships and heavy cruisers.
This new warship, which emphasizes naval surface fire support, is neither a battleship nor a cruiser, but is large enough to be either one. It's the USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), and the Navy insists on calling it a destroyer, even though its core mission is far from what one would expect from a destroyer.
The Zumwalt is 600 feet long, nearly 81 feet wide, and displaces 14,800 tons, which makes this vessel larger than the Navy's fleet of Ticonderoga-class cruisers (CG 47), WAY larger than the Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG 51), and is only slightly smaller than the 1950s-vintage Navy nuclear-powered Long Beach-class cruiser.
The Zumwalt, in fact, is roughly the mass of a Virginia-class battleship (BB 13), which was at sea from 1906 to 1920. The Zumwalt, however, is longer than the Virginia, which was only 441 feet long compared to the Zumwalt's 600 feet. The new "destroyer" is the largest vessel seen in a long time -- perhaps ever -- in and around the Bath, Me. shipyards where it is still under construction.
Curiously, despite everything to the contrary, the Navy insists on calling this behemoth a destroyer.
Think of a modern destroyer and several things come to mind. This kind of vessel is supposed to be a relatively small, fast, and maneuverable ship with plenty of anti-aircraft missiles, powerful radar, and advanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. The Zumwalt isn't that kind of ship.
This ship is built around the Advanced Gun System (AGS), a 155-millimeter cannon that is designed to hurl special shells as far as 83 nautical miles at a rate of 10 rounds per minute. That's a lot of firepower, and might even rival the destructive power of the Iowa-class battleships that the Zumwalt is designed to replace.
The four World War II-era Iowa-class ships -- the Iowa, the Wisconsin, the New Jersey, and the Missouri -- each had nine 16-inch guns as their main armament. They fired big shells, but with a range of just 20 miles -- far shorter than the Zumwalt's armament.
The Zumwalt's Advanced Gun System has a water-cooled barrel that helps give it such an impressive rate of fire. Just one gun can fire 10 rounds per minute. The nine 16-inch guns on an Iowa-class battleship combined could fire 18 rounds per minute.
One of the biggest selling points for the Zumwalt-class destroyer is its heavy use of automation. The big ship needs just 140 officers and enlisted personnel to operate. The cruiser Long Beach needed a crew of 1,100 to operate, while the old Virginia-class battleships needed about that many. The Iowa-class ships needed 1,800 to 2,700 sailors to operate.
The Zumwalt should be ready for deployment at sea in two or three more years. It's scheduled to have two sister ships in the class, the USS Michael Monsoor and the USS Lyndon B. Johnson. It's doubtful that any more of these kinds of ships will be built.
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 12 Nov. 2013. U.S. Navy leaders have launched the first in a new class of surface warships designed for shore bombardment -- a job that traditionally belongs to battleships and heavy cruisers.
This new warship, which emphasizes naval surface fire support, is neither a battleship nor a cruiser, but is large enough to be either one. It's the USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), and the Navy insists on calling it a destroyer, even though its core mission is far from what one would expect from a destroyer.
The Zumwalt is 600 feet long, nearly 81 feet wide, and displaces 14,800 tons, which makes this vessel larger than the Navy's fleet of Ticonderoga-class cruisers (CG 47), WAY larger than the Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG 51), and is only slightly smaller than the 1950s-vintage Navy nuclear-powered Long Beach-class cruiser.
The Zumwalt, in fact, is roughly the mass of a Virginia-class battleship (BB 13), which was at sea from 1906 to 1920. The Zumwalt, however, is longer than the Virginia, which was only 441 feet long compared to the Zumwalt's 600 feet. The new "destroyer" is the largest vessel seen in a long time -- perhaps ever -- in and around the Bath, Me. shipyards where it is still under construction.
Think of a modern destroyer and several things come to mind. This kind of vessel is supposed to be a relatively small, fast, and maneuverable ship with plenty of anti-aircraft missiles, powerful radar, and advanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. The Zumwalt isn't that kind of ship.
This ship is built around the Advanced Gun System (AGS), a 155-millimeter cannon that is designed to hurl special shells as far as 83 nautical miles at a rate of 10 rounds per minute. That's a lot of firepower, and might even rival the destructive power of the Iowa-class battleships that the Zumwalt is designed to replace.
The four World War II-era Iowa-class ships -- the Iowa, the Wisconsin, the New Jersey, and the Missouri -- each had nine 16-inch guns as their main armament. They fired big shells, but with a range of just 20 miles -- far shorter than the Zumwalt's armament.
One of the biggest selling points for the Zumwalt-class destroyer is its heavy use of automation. The big ship needs just 140 officers and enlisted personnel to operate. The cruiser Long Beach needed a crew of 1,100 to operate, while the old Virginia-class battleships needed about that many. The Iowa-class ships needed 1,800 to 2,700 sailors to operate.
The Zumwalt should be ready for deployment at sea in two or three more years. It's scheduled to have two sister ships in the class, the USS Michael Monsoor and the USS Lyndon B. Johnson. It's doubtful that any more of these kinds of ships will be built.
Tuesday, November 5, 2013
International suspicions of U.S. encryption technology putting defense companies in a bind
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 5 Nov. 2013. Major U.S. defense contractors may be in worse shape than we know, as defense budgets shrink, sequestration takes its toll, and as more and more experts conclude that the era of large-scale conventional military conflict is coming to a close.
At one time military technology represented the state of the art, but those days are long past. Today, driven by cell phones, tablet computers, tiny cameras, and other handheld computing and communications capability, commercial companies have catapulted past military contractors as purveyors of cutting-edge technology.
As often as not these days, in fact, the military relies on commercially developed technology adapted to military uses for many advanced defense systems. One of the few areas where military technology reigns supreme involves information security, encryption, and cryptography.
So today what's to differentiate defense contractors from commercial companies in the race to develop new technologies? Until now one of the big ones has involved information security and encryption. These often-proprietary technologies can safeguard military computers and communications equipment from hackers and unauthorized eavesdropping.
U.S. data security and encryption technology long has been favored around the world to keep critical information away from prying eyes.
All that may be changing, however, because of the recent and seemingly continuous scandals involving the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), which is accused of spying not only on U.S. citizens, but also on national leaders throughout the world.
As a result, it's rumored that governments around the world -- even those that historically have been closely allied to the U.S. -- are souring on U.S.-developed information security and encryption out of fear that the NSA may be building back doors into these systems to enhance NSA global intelligence gathering capabilities.
In the long run it doesn't matter whether the NSA is or is not engaging in these kinds of activities. What matters is perception, and globally this is turning against U.S. military encryption technology, which must be certified by the NSA.
This leaves U.S. prime military contractors in a tight spot. Already battered at home by shrinking Pentagon budgets, these contractors had been counting on continuing international sales of military technology to maintain their revenue streams.
Yet with a chilling international market for U.S.-developed information and communications systems that depend on reliable security and encryption, U.S. defense companies may have to dig even deeper to find reliable markets for their wares overseas.
At one time military technology represented the state of the art, but those days are long past. Today, driven by cell phones, tablet computers, tiny cameras, and other handheld computing and communications capability, commercial companies have catapulted past military contractors as purveyors of cutting-edge technology.
As often as not these days, in fact, the military relies on commercially developed technology adapted to military uses for many advanced defense systems. One of the few areas where military technology reigns supreme involves information security, encryption, and cryptography.
So today what's to differentiate defense contractors from commercial companies in the race to develop new technologies? Until now one of the big ones has involved information security and encryption. These often-proprietary technologies can safeguard military computers and communications equipment from hackers and unauthorized eavesdropping.
U.S. data security and encryption technology long has been favored around the world to keep critical information away from prying eyes.
All that may be changing, however, because of the recent and seemingly continuous scandals involving the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), which is accused of spying not only on U.S. citizens, but also on national leaders throughout the world.
In the long run it doesn't matter whether the NSA is or is not engaging in these kinds of activities. What matters is perception, and globally this is turning against U.S. military encryption technology, which must be certified by the NSA.
This leaves U.S. prime military contractors in a tight spot. Already battered at home by shrinking Pentagon budgets, these contractors had been counting on continuing international sales of military technology to maintain their revenue streams.
Yet with a chilling international market for U.S.-developed information and communications systems that depend on reliable security and encryption, U.S. defense companies may have to dig even deeper to find reliable markets for their wares overseas.
Tuesday, October 29, 2013
Defense industry left guessing as Army struggles forward with an unclear mission
Posted by John Keller
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 29 Oct. 2013. Circumstances are gathering into a potential perfect storm that may threaten not only the U.S. Army's future mission, but also how the defense industry can move forward to support the Army's needs, and even the continuing relevance of the America's oldest American military service.
Some of these are well-known: sequestration, dim prospects for future military budget growth, and defense technology research and development, which for practical purposes has come nearly to a dead-stop.
Perhaps most serious, however, is how top military and civilian leaders can define the Army's role as the nation moves into the future, how they identify the top threats the Army must face, and how they justify the need for a large standing Army in an era when large-scale big-iron military land battles appear to be part of the past.
Here's where we are today: U.S. military forces are finishing their exit from Iraq, where they have operated for more than a decade. Their final exit from Afghanistan is but a few years off, or less. When operations in Southwest Asia are completed, where does the Army go from there?
Think about it. The Army has had a clear set of missions since the U.S. entered World War II. Although the close of that war saw a rapid drawdown in U.S. military power, the strengthening Soviet Union at that time weighed heavily on everyone's mind.
Less than five years after World War II ended, North Korean invaded South Korea, which created another sudden and dire mission for the Army. That mission grew from containing North Korean forces to containing Communism around the world, which continued until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990.
One year later, Iraq invaded Kuwait, which triggered Operation Desert Shield, and eventually the military ouster of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. In both these military initiatives the Army played a central role.
For the next decade keeping an eye on a contained-but-restless Iraqi military, on ethnic strife in what then was Yugoslavia, and on other simmering hot spots throughout the world held the Army's attention and helped shape its mission.
Today, however, we find ourselves in different circumstances. Counter-insurgency operations are nearing an end in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia does not pose the immediate military threat that did its predecessors of the Soviet Union, and Europe has been relatively quiet.
Still, trouble spots persist in areas like Syria and Iran, yet with no open conflict involving U.S. Army forces. There is no immediate and dire threat in these areas, and hence no clear Army mission -- at least not yet.
So how does the Army move forward? Counter-insurgency? Certainly. Special Forces capability? Of course. But what's the role of the established Army infrastructure that involves large combat infantry units, main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and an order of battle designed for large ground conflicts?
I'm not sure there is a role, and I'm not convinced that the top Army leadership today knows what its role in the future will be, either.
Maybe the Army simply is at a moment of transition, and leaders will get a handle on the Army's core mission sometime soon. On the other hand, with the civilian leadership vacuum we have today in Washington, I'm not sure the Army will be able to do so.
This leaves the defense industry charged with supporting the Army perhaps in a more precarious position than it has been since the end of World War II nearly 70 years ago. If Army leaders are unable to define the Army's long-term mission clearly, then the defense industry will have no idea how to proceed, other than to guess.
These factors were on display just below the surface last week at the Army's big annual trade show in Washington -- the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).
Show exhibits revolved around what has been important up to now -- IED-proof wheeled armored vehicles, fast-response air power in the form of tiltrotor aircraft and fast helicopters, advanced body armor, and network-centric warfare equipment like wearable computers, small software-defined radios, and agile satellite communications.
What was striking at AUSA, however, was a lack of direction in where we go from here. It was as though the industry were pointing out to the Army officers walking the aisles how far technology has led us to this moment, yet pleading for direction on where the industry should go from here.
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 29 Oct. 2013. Circumstances are gathering into a potential perfect storm that may threaten not only the U.S. Army's future mission, but also how the defense industry can move forward to support the Army's needs, and even the continuing relevance of the America's oldest American military service.
Some of these are well-known: sequestration, dim prospects for future military budget growth, and defense technology research and development, which for practical purposes has come nearly to a dead-stop.
Perhaps most serious, however, is how top military and civilian leaders can define the Army's role as the nation moves into the future, how they identify the top threats the Army must face, and how they justify the need for a large standing Army in an era when large-scale big-iron military land battles appear to be part of the past.
Here's where we are today: U.S. military forces are finishing their exit from Iraq, where they have operated for more than a decade. Their final exit from Afghanistan is but a few years off, or less. When operations in Southwest Asia are completed, where does the Army go from there?
Think about it. The Army has had a clear set of missions since the U.S. entered World War II. Although the close of that war saw a rapid drawdown in U.S. military power, the strengthening Soviet Union at that time weighed heavily on everyone's mind.
Less than five years after World War II ended, North Korean invaded South Korea, which created another sudden and dire mission for the Army. That mission grew from containing North Korean forces to containing Communism around the world, which continued until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990.
For the next decade keeping an eye on a contained-but-restless Iraqi military, on ethnic strife in what then was Yugoslavia, and on other simmering hot spots throughout the world held the Army's attention and helped shape its mission.
Today, however, we find ourselves in different circumstances. Counter-insurgency operations are nearing an end in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia does not pose the immediate military threat that did its predecessors of the Soviet Union, and Europe has been relatively quiet.
Still, trouble spots persist in areas like Syria and Iran, yet with no open conflict involving U.S. Army forces. There is no immediate and dire threat in these areas, and hence no clear Army mission -- at least not yet.
So how does the Army move forward? Counter-insurgency? Certainly. Special Forces capability? Of course. But what's the role of the established Army infrastructure that involves large combat infantry units, main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and an order of battle designed for large ground conflicts?
I'm not sure there is a role, and I'm not convinced that the top Army leadership today knows what its role in the future will be, either.
Maybe the Army simply is at a moment of transition, and leaders will get a handle on the Army's core mission sometime soon. On the other hand, with the civilian leadership vacuum we have today in Washington, I'm not sure the Army will be able to do so.
This leaves the defense industry charged with supporting the Army perhaps in a more precarious position than it has been since the end of World War II nearly 70 years ago. If Army leaders are unable to define the Army's long-term mission clearly, then the defense industry will have no idea how to proceed, other than to guess.
These factors were on display just below the surface last week at the Army's big annual trade show in Washington -- the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).
Show exhibits revolved around what has been important up to now -- IED-proof wheeled armored vehicles, fast-response air power in the form of tiltrotor aircraft and fast helicopters, advanced body armor, and network-centric warfare equipment like wearable computers, small software-defined radios, and agile satellite communications.
What was striking at AUSA, however, was a lack of direction in where we go from here. It was as though the industry were pointing out to the Army officers walking the aisles how far technology has led us to this moment, yet pleading for direction on where the industry should go from here.
Tuesday, October 22, 2013
These are tough times for the combat vehicle and vetronics industries
Posted by John Keller
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 22 Oct. 2013. The most prominent exhibits this week at the Association of the U.S. Army trade show in Washington involve glittering versions of the latest fast, armored, and networked military vehicles. Nevertheless, make no mistake, these are tough times for the U.S. combat vehicle and vetronics industries.
U.S. forces are wrapping up their withdrawal from Iraq, and the military draw down from Afghanistan is far along. Fleets of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, armored humvees, and self-propelled artillery have begun to sit idle, with little prospect for their continued operation anytime soon.
With this growing surplus of armored combat vehicles, demand for new vehicles and retrofits is at its lowest point in years. Sure, the industry is trying to put a good face on it with well-publicized programs for a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and new Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), but where's the demand? More importantly, with the budgetary problems the U.S. government has these days, where's the money?
Military combat vehicle manufacturers like General Dynamics Land Systems in Sterling Heights, Mich., BAE Systems Land & Armaments in Arlington, Va., and Oshkosh Corp. in Oshkosh, Wis., are doing their best to keep themselves relevant amid these stark new realities.
These combat vehicle designers are building their latest models from the ground up to handle network-centric warfare, with built-in computer networking backbones to integrate surveillance, targeting, electronic warfare, and communications systems, and accommodate new technologies seamlessly in plug-and-play architectures.
These will be come of the world's most advanced and capable combat vehicles ever made. Just as important, today's combat vehicle manufacturers are designing vehicles to confront the most dire threats from insurgents and terrorists whose favorite weapon is the improvised explosive device (IED).
The V-shaped underbelly structures of the latest combat vehicles are designed to protect against IED explosions and other roadside booby-trap threats. Their suspensions enable soldiers inside to drink coffee in safety and comfort even while tearing over rugged off-road terrain at 40 miles per hour.
Despite all this, however, dwindling military budgets and growing fleets of idle combat vehicles bode ill for the immediate future of the combat vehicle and vetronics industries.
Many in the defense industry are coming around the realization that the era of the heavy-iron U.S. military might be over. In the future, those companies that can accommodate a fast, agile, and Special-Forces-centric military may be the big winners.
Those who don't may take their places in the graveyards of irrelevant technologies.
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 22 Oct. 2013. The most prominent exhibits this week at the Association of the U.S. Army trade show in Washington involve glittering versions of the latest fast, armored, and networked military vehicles. Nevertheless, make no mistake, these are tough times for the U.S. combat vehicle and vetronics industries.
U.S. forces are wrapping up their withdrawal from Iraq, and the military draw down from Afghanistan is far along. Fleets of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, armored humvees, and self-propelled artillery have begun to sit idle, with little prospect for their continued operation anytime soon.
With this growing surplus of armored combat vehicles, demand for new vehicles and retrofits is at its lowest point in years. Sure, the industry is trying to put a good face on it with well-publicized programs for a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and new Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), but where's the demand? More importantly, with the budgetary problems the U.S. government has these days, where's the money?
Military combat vehicle manufacturers like General Dynamics Land Systems in Sterling Heights, Mich., BAE Systems Land & Armaments in Arlington, Va., and Oshkosh Corp. in Oshkosh, Wis., are doing their best to keep themselves relevant amid these stark new realities.
These combat vehicle designers are building their latest models from the ground up to handle network-centric warfare, with built-in computer networking backbones to integrate surveillance, targeting, electronic warfare, and communications systems, and accommodate new technologies seamlessly in plug-and-play architectures.
The V-shaped underbelly structures of the latest combat vehicles are designed to protect against IED explosions and other roadside booby-trap threats. Their suspensions enable soldiers inside to drink coffee in safety and comfort even while tearing over rugged off-road terrain at 40 miles per hour.
Despite all this, however, dwindling military budgets and growing fleets of idle combat vehicles bode ill for the immediate future of the combat vehicle and vetronics industries.
Many in the defense industry are coming around the realization that the era of the heavy-iron U.S. military might be over. In the future, those companies that can accommodate a fast, agile, and Special-Forces-centric military may be the big winners.
Those who don't may take their places in the graveyards of irrelevant technologies.
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
Is the government shutdown a harbinger of more ominous things to come?
Posted by John Keller
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 15 Oct. 2013. The U.S. government shutdown is entering its third week, with only vague rumors of ending the stalemate, and no real solutions in sight. While it's easy to find people to blame, and argue over potential solutions, it's clear that the shutdown is taking a toll on the defense industry and on the American population as a whole.
While I see abundant news stories that cover accusations and counter-accusations, proposals and counter-proposals, demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, all of these details ... this minutiae of monument closings, people forced from national parks, and rotting vegetables in the White House garden ... either miss or ignore a central issue that lies at the heart of this conflict.
Our American culture is more fragmented and polarized than perhaps at any other time since the Civil War 150 years ago. What we face today even might represent an American population even more fundamentally divided in its dreams and aspirations than it was during the Civil War, and here's why.
As the Union started pulling itself apart in 1860 along regional north-and-south lines, the antagonists were in agreement about the nature of government: it was essentially to nurture an equality of opportunity. Few people at the time argued over the fundamental role of government. The sticking point was one side allowed slavery and the other didn't. With the eventual abolishment of slavery at the war's close, there wasn't anything serious enough left to fight about, and we've had relative domestic peace for a century and a half.
Today it's different. We have a population in disagreement over how and why the government should exist. On the one hand we have segments who believe the government's role is to nurture individual initiative, encourage private business, and aid the individual's ability to reap the rewards of his own work.
On the other hand we have those who believe the government's role is to guarantee not only equal opportunity, but also equality of outcome -- that is, a sharing of wealth to ensure that everyone has a fair share, and that no one has to do without.
The notion of fairness is a central component of this great American divide as we push into the 21st century. An economic system based on individual initiative is not fair in terms of outcome, but it's fair in terms of opportunity. Results in this system, however, are not fair at all. We have vastly different economic strata from very rich to very poor. People drive different cars and live in different-sized houses. There are winners and losers, in other words. Should the government stand back and let this happen, or intervene on behalf of the less fortunate?
A vast segment of the American population today sees a system of winners and losers as unacceptable. How is it that anyone should be poor when there are those with great wealth? Why is it that the United States uses the lion's share of Earth's energy resources when some around the world don't even have electric lights? Why should some people have access to the best of medical care when others are relegated to crowded hospital emergency rooms? It's not fair, they point out, and something should be done about it. To these people, it is the role of government to determine what is fair for all, and mandate procedures on how to get there.
Both sides are passionate in their beliefs. Those who champion individual initiative point to the economic vitality of a culture encouraged to work hard, take risks, come up with new solutions, and invent new things. Those who promote economic equality maintain that a culture without want or envy enables each individual to be his best.
Viewed in this way, how can we claim with certainty which side is right and which side is wrong? What's clear, however, is many on each side today would be willing to die for their beliefs if pressed by circumstances to do so. It was much the same in 1860.
We as a nation in the 21st century are not all on the same page; far from it, and we're drifting farther and farther apart. We see isolated voices pleading for good-faith bargaining and compromise, but I wonder if it's too late for that. We as Americans have been focusing on what divides us rather than on what unites us for a very long time -- longer than most of us can remember.
History tells us, however, that once a nation's population divides itself on ideological lines far enough, and for long enough, that there's no going back. The strain becomes too great, and the most trivial of events can push things past the breaking point.
Although Americans have a long shared history, I wonder if we have reached this breaking point. Is this government shutdown just an isolated incident, or is it a harbinger of much more ominous things to come?
With this in mind, shall we continue arguing over who's right and who's wrong, and keep proposing solutions in direct conflict with one another? At what moment do we realize, finally, that we're playing with matches in a fireworks factory?
THE MIL & AERO BLOG, 15 Oct. 2013. The U.S. government shutdown is entering its third week, with only vague rumors of ending the stalemate, and no real solutions in sight. While it's easy to find people to blame, and argue over potential solutions, it's clear that the shutdown is taking a toll on the defense industry and on the American population as a whole.
While I see abundant news stories that cover accusations and counter-accusations, proposals and counter-proposals, demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, all of these details ... this minutiae of monument closings, people forced from national parks, and rotting vegetables in the White House garden ... either miss or ignore a central issue that lies at the heart of this conflict.
Our American culture is more fragmented and polarized than perhaps at any other time since the Civil War 150 years ago. What we face today even might represent an American population even more fundamentally divided in its dreams and aspirations than it was during the Civil War, and here's why.
As the Union started pulling itself apart in 1860 along regional north-and-south lines, the antagonists were in agreement about the nature of government: it was essentially to nurture an equality of opportunity. Few people at the time argued over the fundamental role of government. The sticking point was one side allowed slavery and the other didn't. With the eventual abolishment of slavery at the war's close, there wasn't anything serious enough left to fight about, and we've had relative domestic peace for a century and a half.
Today it's different. We have a population in disagreement over how and why the government should exist. On the one hand we have segments who believe the government's role is to nurture individual initiative, encourage private business, and aid the individual's ability to reap the rewards of his own work.
The notion of fairness is a central component of this great American divide as we push into the 21st century. An economic system based on individual initiative is not fair in terms of outcome, but it's fair in terms of opportunity. Results in this system, however, are not fair at all. We have vastly different economic strata from very rich to very poor. People drive different cars and live in different-sized houses. There are winners and losers, in other words. Should the government stand back and let this happen, or intervene on behalf of the less fortunate?
A vast segment of the American population today sees a system of winners and losers as unacceptable. How is it that anyone should be poor when there are those with great wealth? Why is it that the United States uses the lion's share of Earth's energy resources when some around the world don't even have electric lights? Why should some people have access to the best of medical care when others are relegated to crowded hospital emergency rooms? It's not fair, they point out, and something should be done about it. To these people, it is the role of government to determine what is fair for all, and mandate procedures on how to get there.
Both sides are passionate in their beliefs. Those who champion individual initiative point to the economic vitality of a culture encouraged to work hard, take risks, come up with new solutions, and invent new things. Those who promote economic equality maintain that a culture without want or envy enables each individual to be his best.
Viewed in this way, how can we claim with certainty which side is right and which side is wrong? What's clear, however, is many on each side today would be willing to die for their beliefs if pressed by circumstances to do so. It was much the same in 1860.
We as a nation in the 21st century are not all on the same page; far from it, and we're drifting farther and farther apart. We see isolated voices pleading for good-faith bargaining and compromise, but I wonder if it's too late for that. We as Americans have been focusing on what divides us rather than on what unites us for a very long time -- longer than most of us can remember.
History tells us, however, that once a nation's population divides itself on ideological lines far enough, and for long enough, that there's no going back. The strain becomes too great, and the most trivial of events can push things past the breaking point.
Although Americans have a long shared history, I wonder if we have reached this breaking point. Is this government shutdown just an isolated incident, or is it a harbinger of much more ominous things to come?
With this in mind, shall we continue arguing over who's right and who's wrong, and keep proposing solutions in direct conflict with one another? At what moment do we realize, finally, that we're playing with matches in a fireworks factory?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)